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THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
By Robert B. McKayt
In 1819 Chief Justice John Marshall, with typical forthrightness,
properly identified the single most important principle for inter-
pretation of the United States Constitution. He said "[W]e must
never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding," and that it
is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs."' It is scarcely neces-
sary to record the fact that Marshall's successors heeded well his ad-
vice. They found in that document sufficient flexibility to assure the
continuously successful operation of the government under widely
varying circumstances from that date to the present, with only occa-
sional formal amendment. No other written constitution has fared so
well.2
Indisputably necessary and desirable as has been this concept of
constitutional flexibility, an inevitable side effect has been seeming
impermanence, even an element of constitutional uncertainty. This
feature of American constitutional law has been much criticized, but
usually for the wrong reasons. Critics of the Court have seized on
overrulings and narrowly conceptual distinctions as somehow im-
proper departures from the ordinary rule of stare decisis. In so com-
plaining, they miss the point that this is precisely the function of a
supreme court which presides over a constitution "intended to endure
for ages to come." It is not the fact that the Court performs a function
of policy formulation, as it must, which should be critically observed.
Rather the potential difficulty is that the Court can become so relativ-
istic in constitutional interpretation that even the absolutes of the
Constitution may be drained of meaning. The danger is that all prob-
lems may be viewed as ones in which opposing values must be weighed
as though on grocers' scales. To cite only the most obvious examples,
it has long been clear that the first amendment admonition that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . ." involves something less than a categori-
cal negative ;3 similarly, the test of whether particular prohibitions of
the Bill of Rights are also limitations upon the states has all the vague-
ness of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and none
of the specificity of the particularized guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
t Professor of Law, New York University.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819).
2. See Supreme Court and Supreme Law c. I (Calm ed. 1954).
3. See, e.g., Rogge, "Congress Shall Make No Law.. .," 56 Mich. L. Rev. 331,
579 (1958).
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Thus, "the concept of ordered liberty"" is the perfect foil for the rela-
tivist's "on the one hand" and "on the other hand" argument.5
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to criticize this doctrine.
Rather these examples are intended as illustrations of the inherent
difficulties involved. One can scarcely expect that particular solutions
to the vital problems of a dynamic constitution will be lastingly satis-
factory. It is the intention in this study to explore a single area of
constitutional dogma where the writer believes that the balancing of
opposing interests, without proper regard for their qualitative differ-
ences, has led the federal courts into serious error. The problem may
be simply stated: To what extent, and in what circumstances, does the
national security interest justify the submerging of the otherwise fully
assured right of a person to be confronted by his accusers?
I
THE RATIONALE OF CONFRONTATION
It is not the purpose here to break new ground in connection with
the theory underlying the right of confrontation. That work has been
done, and well.* Rather the more limited objective is to restate those
principles, particularly in the context of denial of confrontation by the
federal government in various kinds of administrative proceedings. It
is the writer's conviction that a reminder of these first principles will
show that regrettable departures from them have been permitted with-
out justification in a number of situations. Appropriate notice will be
taken of the possibly different applications of the rule in connection
with criminal trials and civil actions, including administrative pro-
ceedings.
Confrontation as a Ride of Evidence.
If the best definition is the simplest, Dean Wigmore's definition of
confrontation qualifies on this score as well as by virtue of the in-
trinsic authority of the author. He said:
The right of confrontation is the right to the opportunity of cross-
examination. Confrontation also involves a subordinate and in-
cidental advantage, namely, the observation by the tribunal of the
witness' demeanor on the stand, as a minor means of judging the
value of his testimony. But this minor advantage is not regarded
4. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
5. See especially Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).
6. 5 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1364-71, 1395-1418 (3d ed. 1940). See also 1 Davis,
Administrative Law §§ 7.05-.20 (1958); McCormick, Evidence §§ 19, 223-25, 231
(1954).
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as essential, i.e., it may be dispensed with when it is not feasible.
Cross-examination, however, the essential object of confrontation,
remains indispensable. (Emphasis added. ) 7
Practical necessity justifies, and fairness does not forbid, use of
former testimony or depositions in some circumstances where the wit-
ness is unavailable "supposing, of course, that in each case there
has been cross-examination."8 But even these departures from the
norm of cross-examination during the trial or proceeding are per-
mitted only to the extent that they promote rather than impede fair-
ness of procedure. Wigmore has strikingly stated the absolute essen-
tiality of cross-examination:
[Cross-examination] is beyond any doubt the greatest legal en-
gine ever invented for the discovery of truth. However, difficult
it may be for the layman, the scientist, or the foreign jurist to
appreciate this its wonderful power, there has probably never
been a moment's doubt upon this point in the mind of a lawyer of
experience. . . If we omit political considerations of broader
range, then cross-examination, not trial by jury, is the great and
permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to
improved methods of trial-procedure.9
In further emphasis of the special significance which Wigmore at-
tached to the opportunity for cross-examination, he said:
In short, however radically the jury-trial rules of Evidence may
be dispensed with [, the right of cross-examination] .. .at least
remains as a fundamental of fair and intelligent investigation of
disputed facts.0
These words, which suggest that the right of cross-examination is re-
quired for a fair trial, 1 raise squarely the constitutional inquiry as to
the extent to which confrontation is necessary in criminal and civil
proceedings. In examining this central question, we shall first make a
cursory study of the specific constitutional guarantees in criminal
trials, specifically the sixth amendment for federal trials, and its carry-
over into state matters through the due process clause of the four-
7. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1365 (3d ed. 1940). For a more complete statement,
see 5 id. §§ 1395-1400.
8. 5 id. § 1401. Other exceptions to the hearsay rule may also excuse con-
frontation, such as dying declarations, 5 id. § 1398; but the witness must always
be offered when available.
9. 5 id. § 1367.
10. 5 id. § 1400.
11. While Wigmore's analysis in the portions quoted, as well as in full develop-
ment, suggests his belief that cross-examination is a constitutional necessity in
all criminal and civil proceedings involving disputed facts, he suggests as a pos-
sible exception certain administrative proceedings such as those leading to dis-
barment, citation for contempt, or deportation. Ibid. See also 5 id. § 1399
nn.12-14. These possible exceptions are discussed in text at notes 105-15 infra.
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teenth amendment. Then, and principally, we shall inquire into the
extent to which the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments make similar demands of fairness for the conduct of civil
proceedings, particularly certain administrative matters in which the
issue is most critically presented.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
The rights of a defendant accused in a criminal proceeding are
principally defined in the sixth amendment to the Constitution. The
entire amendment is reproduced below to preserve the proper setting
for those portions which are specifically relevant, which are set forth
in italics:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
Even the most casual reading of the entire text of the sixth amend-
ment reveals the crucial importance of the right to be confronted with
adverse witnesses and the closely related right to be informed of the
charges. The other safeguards are essentially amplifications of these
central guarantees. For example, the right to a public trial is one
special manifestation of the confrontation requirement, and one which
the Court has insisted is an essential ingredient of a fair trial in state
as well as federal courts.1 2 Similarly, the right to compulsory process
in securing witnesses is, in one of its important aspects, simply an
adjunct of making effective the right of confrontation. Even the right
to counsel becomes in large part significant as an assurance to the
accused that full advantage can be taken by a trained specialist of
what Wigmore called the "art of cross-examination."',
3
Federal Criminal Proceedings.
The command of the sixth amendment is explicit. The accused shall
have the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion" and the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
The manifest reason for the inclusion of these protections in the Con-
stitution was to assure the same rights in this respect that were al-
ready familiar attributes of the common law. There seems never to
12. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
13. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1368 (3d ed. 1940).
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have been any serious challenge in criminal cases in the federal courts
to the rights which the plain meaning of the language appears to in-
sure: a sufficiently informative indictment to allow adequate prepara-
tion of the defense and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
whose testimony might be used against the accused in his trial. Cases
in the Supreme Court involving an interpretation of these provisions
have related exclusively to determining whether the exceptions recog-
nized by the common law were carried over into the apparently abso-
lute language of the sixth amendment. The answer in general has been
in the affirmative so long as the result did not unfairly prejudice the
accused. Thus, an accused is not by this provision entitled to the names
of witnesses before the grand jury. 4 On the other hand, no violation
of the sixth amendment is involved in the admission of dying declara-
tions "- or the testimony given at a former trial by a witness since de-
ceased.16
State Criminal Proceedings.
In a number of different contexts the Supreme Court has stated that
the right to notice of the charge is guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment against state interference.17 Less
clear from decisions of the Supreme Court is the extent to which the
confrontation requirement of the sixth amendment is carried over by
the fourteenth amendment as a limitation on state action. Twice the
Court has stated, in cases which did not require so broad a ruling, that
there was no such incorporation;8 on the other hand, the Court has
unequivocally stated that the states must provide an opportunity for
cross-examination. 9
The first case to deny the applicability of the confrontation require-
14. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 375 (1911); Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263, 304 (1892). But an accused is entitled to the names of in-
formers not appearing at the trial where it "is relevant and helpful to the de-
fense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause ....
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
15. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). This of course is
simply an application of an established exception to the hearsay rule. See also
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911).
16. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Cf. Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878).
17. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ; Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 632 (1916); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 111, 112 (1908). Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 440 (1932).
18. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 195-96 (1953); West v. Louisiana, 194
U.S. 258, 264 (1904).
19. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
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ment in state criminal proceedings was West v. Louisiana, 20 decided
in 1904. The question in that case involved the admissibility of the
deposition of a witness not present at the trial who was then perma-
nently absent from the state. The deposition had been taken before
the committing magistrate, in the presence of the accused; and de-
fendant's counsel cross-examined the witness at that time. There was
in this case then no denial of confrontation; indeed, the sixth amend-
ment would be no barrier to the admissibility in a federal court of
a deposition taken under similar circumstances.21 Accordingly, it
was totally unnecessary for the Court to state, as it did, that "the
Sixth Amendment does not apply to the state courts .... -22 A
further difficulty in using that statement as precedent is the fact that
other provisions of the sixth amendment have since been specifically
held applicable to state criminal proceedings.23 West v. Louisiana
should be disregarded.
Although it is believed that Stein v. New York 24 is equally erroneous
in its statements about confrontation, it cannot be so readily disposed
of as the West decision. In Stein, one of three defendants convicted
of a felony murder complained of the use in evidence against him of
the confessions of his codefendants, who did not take the stand so that
he was unable to cross-examine them. In finding this unobjectionable
on due process grounds the majority simply cited West v. Louisiana,
already shown to be unreliable on the proposition there stated. With-
out any independent analysis, the Court in Stein noted that
[defendant's] objection to the introduction of these confessions is
that as to him they are hearsay. The hearsay-evidence rule, with
all its subtleties, anomalies and ramifications, will not be read into
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. West v. State of Louisiana,
supra.25
But again this statement misses the point. No responsible authority
suggests that the hearsay rule was incorporated intact and unvariably
rigid in either the sixth amendment or the due process concept of the
fourteenth amendment. As Wigmore pointed out, the hearsay rule can
be said to define the limits of confrontation only by recalling that the
20. 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
21. "The rule sanctioned by the Constitution is the Hearsay rule as to cross-
examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found, developed,
or created therein." 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1397. Cf. Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480
(4th Cir. 1958); Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1954).
22. West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 264 (1904).
23. E.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right of public trial); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right of counsel in capital cases).
24. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
25. Id. at 196.
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sixth amendment incorporates "all the exceptions that may legiti-
mately be found, developed, or created therein."2 Objection to the
holding in Stein, then, is based not upon any disagreement with the
Court's refusal to be bound by the "subtleties, anomalies and ramifica-
tions" of the hearsay rule, but because the result is thought to be
eminently unfair and thus a denial of due process -.2 If the Court were
to reach the same result in a federal criminal case, it would seem
equally wrong.28
Where the use of evidence not subject to cross-examination was
more squarely before the Court in In re Oliver,29 the Court developed
the point more fully and reasoned carefully to its conclusion. In that
case, when a Michigan judge, acting as a one-man grand jury and
relying at least in part on the testimony of an earlier witness with
whom defendant was not confronted, sentenced the defendant for con-
tempt for giving allegedly false and evasive testimony, the Court held
the practice a denial of due process. As Justice Black said on this
aspect of the case:
We further hold that failure to afford petitioner a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself against the charge of false and
evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law. A person's
right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are
basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as
a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel. (Emphasis added.) 10
A more direct holding seems scarcely necessary. Whatever may be
the extent to which the attendance of an accused may be dispensed
with during some portion of the trial proceedings,31 it cannot be
doubted that due process in criminal trials, in state as well as in fed-
eral courts, requires a fair opportunity for cross-examination.
Civil Proceedings: Litigation Between Private Parties.
It might be thought that private litigation involving issues of con-
tract, property, or tort, for example, would not raise constitutional
26. See note 21 supra.
27. The Stein case has been much criticized. E.g., Garfinkel, The Fourteenth
Amendment and State Criminal Proceedings--"Ordered Liberty" or "Just Deserts,"
41 Calif. L. Rev. 672 (1953); Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation
of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1954). See
also Scott, State Criminal Procedure, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Preju-
dice, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 319 (1954).
28. Cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899). But see Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S.
232 (1957); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
29. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
30. Id. at 273.
31. E.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
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issues involving confrontation and cross-examination. And the re-
ported cases might appear to support such a conclusion because the
right of cross-examination is ordinarily not discussed in terms of con-
stitutional right. Rather, the matter is dealt with as a question of
evidence, specifically as an application of the hearsay rule. Clearly,
due process is no less required in civil than in criminal proceedings,
for manifestly there is no hearing when the party does not know
what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an opportu-
nity to test, explain, or refute . .. All parties must be fully ap-
prised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be
given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect docu-
ments and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other
way can a party maintain its rights or make its defense.32
Although there are, to be sure, differences of detail in the demands
of fairness in the civil as opposed to the criminal forum, it has never
been suggested that fairness of procedure is not essential. Thus, where
an opportunity to cross-examine is an ingredient of fairness, as it
ordinarily is, it would seem to be an indispensable part of due process.
It would scarcely be argued that one who may be directly and ad-
versely affected by the outcome of a civil suit is not entitled to fair no-
tice and reasonable opportunity to present his case. The opportunity to
answer of course includes the right of the defendant to know the evi-
dence against him and an opportunity to challenge by cross-examina-
tion. That this requirement is formally enforced as a rule of evidence
rather than as an articulated principle of constitutional law makes no
difference. As already pointed out, the central purpose of the hearsay
rule (of which the right of cross-examination is but the specific em-
bodiment) is firmly embedded in the concept of fairness. It seems
inconceivable that a private litigant would assert his right to be heard
ex parte, or that he would ask the court to consider his own summaries
of statements made to him in confidence by persons whose names he
would not disclose to the court. One can well imagine that a common-
law judge would be sufficiently outraged by such a request to consider
the summary dismissal of the cause of action of a complainant who
based his claim on such foundation.
The result, however, might be, and indeed often has been, different
where only one of the parties to a civil proceeding was a private in-
32. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S.
88, 93 (1913). See also Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 276 (1949); Carter v.
Kubler, 320 U.S. 243, 247 (1943); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301
U.S. 292, 300, 304 (1937); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n (No. 1),
294 U.S. 63, 68 (1935); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 195 (1933);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165, 168 (1914).
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dividual and there was arrayed against him an official representative
of government pleading special exception to the uniformly accepted
rules of fairness in the name of national security.
III
FAIRNESS VERSUS NATIONAL SECURITY: THE UNEQUAL CONTEST
Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due
process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly re-
quires. Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible
than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies
less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative judg-
ment ....
.... Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispen-
sable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured
if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the
choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law
applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than under
our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices. Let
it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole
benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government
itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a
system of justice but which are bound to occur on ex parte con-
sideration.33
Presumably no one would quarrel with Justice Jackson's tribute to
the unyielding and inexorable quality inherent in concepts of proce-
dural due process. Indeed, even during the stress of wartime emer-
gency, the principle of procedural fairness has stood up well.14 Accord-
ingly, there is strange irony in the inescapable conclusion that proce-
dural due process has since World War II repeatedly given way to the
flatly asserted demands of national security. Examination of this
phenomenon prompts a threefold inquiry. First, we shall notice the
various situations in which rights of procedural due process (i.e., in
this context, the principles of notice and confrontation) have been re-
linquished to the exigent demands of national security. Second, we
shall inquire into the cost, if any, exacted in terms of lessened national
33. Justice Jackson, dissenting, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953). Or, as Justice Frankfurter put it, "The history of
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure." Malinski
v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (concurring opinion). See also, e.g.,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 167 (1951) (con-
curring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
34. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). But cf. Koki Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197
(1948); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The most serious war-related in-
vasions of personal liberty involved primarily questions of substantive due pro-
cess. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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security if the right of confrontation should be assured. And finally,
we shall ask what the Constitution demands in terms of procedural
due process.
A. Confrontation Denied.
In the postvar period during which confrontation has consistently
been denied in a number of different situations, it is a curious fact that
in other respects procedural due process has taken on new dimensions
in making ever more scrupulous the demand of society that the game
be played according to strict rules of fairness. Although some of these
matters will be more fully developed subsequently, it is appropriate to
note here the general movement of the law. In criminal proceedings,
to identify only a few of the distinctly new rules, the indigent defen-
dant is now assured that he will not be at a disadvantage in making
an appeal by reason of poverty;", the defendant is entitled to inspec-
tion of statements to FBI agents to impeach testimony of witnesses
against him;' and the identity of confidential informants may not
be concealed where fairness to the accused requires disclosure.37 Sim-
ilarly, in civil proceedings, the right of an organization not to be
listed as subversive on the basis, even in insubstantial part, of perjured
testimony has been applied to the testimony of confidential inform-
ants; an organization may not be listed as subversive without a fair
hearing; 'I and neither a person nor an organization can be required to
assume the burden of proving nonsubversive qualities in order to
secure the advantages of tax exemption.40 Other examples come to
mind as well, but these suffice to make the point that protection of
procedural due process is a cardinal tenet of contemporary constitu-
tional law-with the single large exception that denial of confronta-
tion has been tolerated in a variety of situations. The principal groups
of individuals to whom confrontation has been held dispensable be-
cause of asserted requirements of national security are the following:
government employees, employees of contractors with the government,
maritime workers, international agencies employees, military person-
nel, aliens, conscientious objectors, and applicants for passports.4 1
. . Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
316. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
37. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
38. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115(1956).
-4. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1941).
40. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); First Unitarian Church v. Los
Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
41. Instances of the denial of confrontation for reasons not primarily con-
cerned with national security are discussed in text at notes 105-15 infra.
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Government Employment4 2
The current programs involving scrutiny of the beliefs and associa-
tions of employees of the federal government date from President
Truman's Executive Order 9835, of March 31, 1947.43 The story of
that program and its successors has been fully told elsewhere 44 and
will not be repeated here. Suffice it to note in the present context that
from the beginning it was provided that
the investigative agency may refuse to disclose the names of con-
fidential informants, provided it furnishes sufficient information
about such informants on the basis of which the requesting de-
partment or agency can make an adequate evaluation of the in-
formation furnished by them, and provided it advises the request-
ing department or agency in writing that it is essential to the
protection of the informants or to the investigation of other cases
that the identity of the informants not be revealed.4G
It should be noted that from the beginning the test of sufficiency of
the information furnished was to be measured by whether "the re-
questing department or agency" could adequately evaluate the infor-
mation. No concern was expressed as to whether the person against
whom the informant testified would be provided with sufficient infor-
mation that he could evaluate or answer the charges. With variations
of detail, this became the pattern for all succeeding legislative and
executive action. The standard which has controlled since 1953 was
fixed in President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10450, of April 27,
1953. 6 It provides that
reports and other investigative material and information shall be
maintained in confidence, and no access shall be given thereto
except, with the consent of the investigative agency concerned, to
other departments and agencies conducting security programs
under the authority granted by or in accordance with [Public
Law 733, 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952)] . .. .
Needless to say, the screening of present and prospective govern-
ment employees under this program was a staggering task, whether
the standard was "reasonable grounds" for belief of disloyalty under
Executive Order 9835, or a required finding that employment was
"clearly consistent with the interests of the national security" under
Executive Order 10450. It must have been equally obvious from the
42. See Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Report of the Special
Committee on The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (1956) (hereinafter cited
as New York Report); Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (1953);
Brown, Loyalty and Security (1958).
43. 3 C.F.R. 627 (1943-48).
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Exec. Order No. 9835, Part IV (2), 3 C.F.R. 627, 630 (1943-48).
46. 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-53).
47. Id. § 9 (c), at 939.
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beginning that the conservatism, timidity, or even sometimes outright
stupidity of screening officers and boards would result in individual
injustices justified in the name of national security. It is scarcely
necessary to review here those now well-publicized instances of seem-
ing arbitrariness.4s The point is sufficiently illustrated in the three
government employment cases which reached the Supreme Court, each
of which involved, or was thought to involve, unfairness resulting from
denial of confrontation.
The only one in which there was anything like a square holding on
the issue, however, was Bailey v. Richardson;49 and even there the
Supreme Court merely affirmed by a four-four division the holding of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, it is
necessary to turn to the opinion of the court of appeals for an examina-
tion of the only relevant holding as to confrontation in the federal
employee loyalty program. In that case Dorothy Bailey, an employee
in the classified civil service of the United States, was advised in 1948
that the Civil Service Commission had received information that she
was then, or had been, a member of the Communist Party or the
Communist Political Association, had attended meetings of the Com-
munist Party, and had associated with known Communist Party mem-
bers. Beyond this she was given no further clue save that information
had been received of her alleged past or present membership in the
American League for Peace and Democracy and the Washington
Committee for Democratic Action, both of which had been declared by
the Attorney General to be subversive within the meaning of the then-
controlling Executive Order 9835. Miss Bailey answered fully, includ-
ing a denial under oath of all such affiliations past or present except
a brief period of membership in the American League for Peace and
Democracy. No witness testified against Miss Bailey; the unfavorable
statements were not made available to her or to the court; and the
informants were not identified to her, to the court, or even to the
Loyalty Review Board. As the majority stated, "she was not given a
trial in any sense of the word, and she does not know who informed
upon her."50 However, in a split decision, the court of appeals held
that "the question is not whether she had a trial. The question is
whether she should have had one." 51 Miss Bailey's constitutional argu-
48. See, e.g., Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Case Studies in Personnel Security
(Yarmolinsky ed. 1955). See also Barth, The Loyalty of Free Men (1951);
Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (1953); O'Brian, National
Security and Individual Freedom (1955).
49. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
50. 182 F.2d at 51.
51. Ibid.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss2/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ments were rejected in their entirety. The sixth amendment was held
inapplicable because the proceeding was not criminal in nature. Nor
was the due process clause of the fifth ammendment considered a
barrier in view of the court's conclusion that government employment
is not a right but a privilege:
[T]he President, absent congressional restriction, may remove
from Government service any person of whose loyalty he is not
completely convinced. He may do so without assigning any reason
and without giving the employee any explanatory notice. If, as a
matter of policy, he chooses to give the employee a general de-
scription of the information which concerns him and to hear what
the employee has to say, he does not thereby strip himself of any
portion of his constitutional power to choose and to remove. 2
Subsequent to the 1951 Supreme Court's inconclusive, four-four
affirmance of the Bailey decision, the loyalty-security program for
government employees came before the Court in two further cases;
but the confrontation issue was not passed upon in either case. In
Peters v. Hobby53 the Court merely held that the Loyalty Review
Board had acted beyond the authority conferred on it by Executive
Order 9835 when of its own motion the Board reopened and reviewed
rulings favorable to employees. The Court did note, however, the
following:
While loyalty proceedings may not involve the imposition of
criminal sanctions, the limitation on the Board's review power to
adverse determinations was in keeping with the deeply rooted
principle of criminal law that a verdict of guilty is appealable
while a verdict of acquittal is not.54
Cole v. Young-5 was the first case in the Supreme Court to raise
questions under Executive Order 10450. However, in that case, al-
though once more challenge was made to the refusal of confrontation,
the issue was not resolved. The Court merely ruled that Public Law
733 of 1950,5 on the basis of which the summary dismissal procedures
of Executive Order 10450 had been extended to all federal government
employees, did not go so far. In short, as a matter of statutory con-
struction, the congressional intent was to limit the special loyalty-
security procedures to so-called sensitive positions in which there were
opportunities for endangering the "national security." Since peti-
tioner did not occupy such a position, the procedures were not properly
applicable to him, and dismissal was improper. While the effect of this
was to curtail sharply the coverage of the federal program, the con-
52. Id. at 65.
53. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
54. Id. at 344-45.
55. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
56. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952).
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stitutional issue was not touched at all. As of early 1959 the matter
remains unchanged except that other cases not directly involving the
loyalty-security program suggest modification of the Court's views.
These are discussed below.- 7
Employees of Government Contractors 8
By far the largest number of individuals affected by the loyalty-
security programs come within the coverage of the Industrial Per-
sonnel Security Program of the Department of Defense. The program
extends to the nearly 3,000,000 employees of contractors with the
armed forces who have access to classified information. 9 The program
provides that companies which satisfy the test of a preliminary facility
clearance, before bidding on a contract, shall agree to accept as a con-
tractual duty the obligation to take the prescribed steps for the pro-
tection of classified information. For present purposes the significant
obligation which the contractor assumes is the undertaking to permit
access to security information only to persons authorized in accordance
with the prescribed procedures. The standard for denial or revocation
of clearance is that access to classified information shall be refused
where it is "not clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security." ,:' Where an initial screening board makes an adverse de-
termination on the basis of this test, the person concerned is given an
opportunity to present his case to the appropriate hearing board,
where he may (or he may not) take solace in the fact that, although
the evidence against him need not be disclosed,
The Board will take into consideration the fact that the person
concerned may have been handicapped in his defense by the non-
disclosure to him of classified information or by his lack of oppor-
tunity to identify or cross-examine persons constituting sources
of information.'
The technical impact of a failure to receive clearance under these
rules is simply that the subject must be refused access to govern-
mentally classified information in the hands of the contractor with
the government. What in fact the denial of clearance means, how-
ever, is that the individual must resign, be discharged, or be moved
to nonsensitive employment, although his skills may relate solely
517. See text at notes 148-49 infra.
58. For a description of the program, see Note, The Role of Employer Prac-
tices in the Federal Industrial Personnel Security Program-A Field Study, 8
Stan. L. Rev. 234 (1956). See also First Ann. Rep., Industrial Personnel Secu-
rity Review Program (1956).
59. New York Report 64.
60. Industrial Personnel Security Review Reg. § 12, First Ann. Rep., Indus-
trial Personnel Security Review Program 174, 180 (1956).
61. Id. § 20(b), p. 189.
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to work requiring clearance. Whichever of these consequences ensues
in a particular case is of course the direct result of the denial of
clearance, so that the impact of the refusal to permit confrontation is
qualitatively the same as in cases involving outright discharge from
government employment. The first important constitutional challenges
to the denial of confrontation in this program are pending before the
Supreme Court in Greene v. McElroy62 and Taylor v. McElroy.6' A
third case, Vitarelli v. Seaton, 4 raises similar issues under the loyalty-
security program for government employees. These cases are dis-
cussed below.65
Program of the Atomic Energy Commission
The AEC administers its own program, applicable to employees of
the Commission and to employees of contractors with the Commission
whose work gives them access to classified information. Thus, there is
combined in this particular field a loyalty-security program for
government employees and for employees of private contractors with
the AEC. Like the general loyalty-security program for other govern-
ment employees and the Defense Department program for other
employees of contractors, information unfavorable to the subject of an
investigation may be withheld even in the hearing made available
to such individual.6
Program for American Employees of International Organizations
Although the United States does not directly control the hiring or
firing of American citizens by international organizations of which
the United States is a member, an International Organizations Em-
ployees Loyalty Board was established in 1953 to give "advisory
determinations" on American citizens employed or considered for
employment by the United Nations and related organizations. 7 The
Board gives to the international organization an advisory opinion
concerning citizens about whom the United States Civil Service Com-
62. 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 872 (1958).
63. Cert. granted, 358 U.S. 918 (1958). The opinion and judgment of the
district court are not reported; no opinion or judgment has been rendered by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
64. 253 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 871 (1958).
65. See text at notes 152-65 infra.
66. Although confrontation of adverse witnesses is encouraged, it may be
denied where the nature or the sources of information are deemed confidential.
New York Report 82 n. For the text of the regulations, see 10 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-.35
(Supp. 1957).
67. Exec. Order No. 10422, 3 C.F.R. 921 (1949-53), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 10459, 3 C.F.R. 945 (1949-53).
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mission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports derogatory
information. In the advisory opinion the reasons are disclosed "in
as much detail as security considerations permit. 6 8
Port Security Program6 9
The Magnuson Act of 195070 authorized the President to institute
measures to safeguard American vessels and harbors upon a finding
that the security of the United States is endangered by war, sub-
versive activity, or disturbance of the international relations of the
United States:' This program was designed to bar employment on any
United States vessel to seamen denied clearance and to proscribe
employment of longshoremen in facilities designated by the Coast
Guard as restricted. As in the other programs already discussed, the
hearing boards were originally authorized to withhold information
deemed confidential. However, in Parker v. Lester ,' 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the hearings, as traditionally
conducted, did not satisfy procedural due process. In that case the
seamen had been denied clearance on security grounds, although they
were given no specific information as to the data relied upon. The
court squarely held that the failure of the regulations to provide
for adequate notice of the charges 73 and confrontation was a denial
of due process, entitling the seamen refused clearance under such
circumstances to an injunction restraining the Coast Guard against
enforcement of the regulation. The government decided against an
appeal, and the Coast Guard issued new regulations.74 Subsequent to
the promulgation of the new regulations, the government argued that
the denial of clearance should be continued until the seamen could be
rescreened and cleared under the new regulations. The contention
was rejected.7 3 Finally, in 1957 the Coast Guard commenced compli-
ance with the final decree by issuing credentials stamped "Order of
U.S. District Court."76 Even under the most recent revision of the
regulations, however, it is not clear that full confrontation is in-
variably available.'
68. New York Report 68.
69. See Brown and Fassett, Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Pro-
cess Under the Port Security Program, 62 Yale L.J. 1163 (1953).
70. 64 Stat. 427 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1952).
71. See Exec. Order No. 10173, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1949-53), as amended by Exec.
Orders No. 10277, 3 C.F.R. 778 (1949-53), and 10352, 3 C.F.R. 873 (1949-53).
72. 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955), reversing, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
73. See United States v. Gray, 207 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1953).
74. Report of the Commission on Government Security 341 (1957).
75. Lester v. Parker, 235 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1956).
76. See Brown, Loyalty and Security 71-73, especially 73 n.18 (1958).
77. 33 C.F.R. Parts 121, 125 (Supp. 1958). See especially sections dealing
with hearing procedures, §§ 121.19, 125.43.
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Military Personnel T7
In connection with loyalty-security inquiries, it has been said that
the man in uniform "is in about the same position as his civilian
counterpart when his membership in the armed services is voluntary,
either as enlisted man or as officer." 711 That is, although he may be
turned away summarily, once in the service he is entitled to whatever
protections, including a hearing, that the program offers. The con-
script is in a somewhat different position because of the presumed
unwillingness of the Department of Defense to allow evasion of
military service through pretended espousal of subversive causes.80
However, in the context of confrontation afforded at hearings, a
generalization seems permissible as to both volunteers and conscripts
that the problem and its resolution are not dissimilar from the civilian
programs."'
The one unique question in the military programs has been whether
or not a less than honorable discharge may be given for preinduction
activities rather than basing the character of the discharge exclusively
upon the record of military service. Without reaching any constitu-
tional issues, the Court resolved that particular problem in Harmon
v. Brucker, 2 holding that the Secretary of the Army exceeded his
statutory authority in basing discharges on activities prior to induc-
tion. There is no indication that this practice has been resumed; but
the confrontation issue remains unchanged.
Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens
If frequency of reiteration be a proper test, it has become a truism
of constitutional law that "whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned.18 3 Accordingly, when the Attorney General, on the basis of
confidential information, denied a hearing to an alien seeking ad-
mission and found that her admission would be prejudicial to the
78. See Brown, Loyalty and Security 81-89 (1958) ; Jones, Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts to Review the Character of Military Administrative Discharges,
57 Colum. L. Rev. 917 (1957).
79. Brown, op. cit. supra note 78, at 81.
80. Id. at 80-81.
81. That is, disclosure may be denied of classified information, and investiga-
tive sources or techniques, including the identity of confidential informants, need
not be revealed. 2 BNA Government Security and Loyalty 31:16 (1957).
82. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
83. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953);
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60
(1892).
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interests of the United States, no voice on the Court was raised in
protest on the constitutional issue. Rather the dissenters claimed
lack of statutory authorizations4 The majority stated:
We reiterate that we are dealing here with a matter of privilege.
Petitioner had no vested right of entry, which could be the subject
of a prohibition against retroactive operation of regulations af-
fecting her status.85
Once admitted to the United States, however, an alien is entitled to
the same procedural due process as citizens, 86 neither less nor more.
Thus, it has been held that, where the Attorney General has statutory
discretion to suspend deportation, refusal so to suspend may be based
on confidential information not disclosed to the applicant. 7 The sus-
pension of deportation was described as "manifestly not a matter of
right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of
grace."8, Although the majority found "no difficulty" with the con-
stitutional issue,"' the four dissenters reflected varying degrees of dis-
satisfaction with the constitutional principle in the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Warren said that "such a hearing is not an administra-
tive hearing in the American sense of the term. It is no hearing."90
Justice Black emphasized his belief that "the core of our constitutional
system is that individual liberty must never be taken away by short-
cuts, that fair trials in independent courts must never be dispensed
with."9'
84. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Justice
Jackson, dissenting, however, did note his extreme reluctance to believe that
Congress intended such unfairness even as to excludable aliens. He said: "Se-
curity is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name ...
In the name of security the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions on evi-
dence that is secret, because security might be prejudiced if it were brought to
light in hearings. The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to
free men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the
meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and un-
corrected." Id. at 551.
85. Id. at 544.
86. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457-58, 464
(1920) ; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
87. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
88. Id. at 354.
89. Id. at 357 n.21.
90. Id. at 362.
91. Id. at 369-70. See also Justice Douglas' dissent, id. at 374, 376, and Justice
Frankfurter's dissent, not specifically on constitutional grounds, id. at 370,
373-74.
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Conscientious Objectors9 2
Section 6 (j) of the Selective Service Act of 1948 provides exemption
from military service-partial or full, depending upon the circum-
stances-for any person "who, by reason of religious training and be-
lief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.");
Where the local board denies relief under this section, the claimant is
entitled to further review by an appeal board. By regulation and
practiceP4 the Department of Justice, relying in whole or part on FBI
investigatory reports, makes a recommendation to the appeal board,
which may or may not take the action recommended. The registrant
is not permitted to see the FBI report nor to be informed of the names
of persons interviewed by the investigators.
The constitutionality of this denial of confrontation was for the first
time passed upon by the Supreme Court in United States v. Nugent?5
In the series of cases consolidated for decision in that case each of the
respondents claimed to be a conscientious objector entitled to full ex-
emption from military service; and each was convicted of wilful re-
fusal to submit to induction. In addition to challenges that the pro-
cedure was not authorized by the relevant statute, the claim was made
that the classification was rendered invalid by the refusal to make the
FBI reports available to the registrants. The Court held that the pro-
cedure was in conformity with the statute. In addition, not meeting
quite squarely the constitutional argument that there was no sufficient
hearing, the Court reasoned that the real hearing was in the hands of
the local board where there was no claim of lack of confrontation. The
majority of the Court thought it sufficient at the level of the recom-
mendatory review to give the applicant a fair r~sum6 of any adverse
information in the investigative report. However, in so far as the re-
view proceeding was in part a hearing de novo at which the govern-
ment could introduce new evidence on an ex parte basis, the decision
can be fairly read only as a holding that confrontation can in these
circumstances be dispensed with.
Although this issue is somewhat distinct from the others here pre-
sented for discussion in that it does not necessarily, or even usually,
turn upon loyalty-security considerations, the problem seems to be the
same. In the Nugent case, although the articulation is rather non-
specific, the rationale appears to be that this departure from normal
hearing procedures is justified by the fact that the Selective Service
Act is an exercise of the war power. Hence the parallelism to national
92. See Note, The Scope of Review, Due Process, and the Conscientious O-
jector-Some Unresolved Problems, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 660, 669-76 (1955).
93. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1952).
94. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25 (Supp. 1958).
95. 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
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security as the overriding consideration in loyalty-security cases seems
proper. Although Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, did not have to
reach the constitutional issue because he thought the proceeding a vio-
lation of congressional intent, he nevertheless stated the real objection
to the form of the review proceeding when he said:
The very purpose of a hearing is to give registrants an opportu-
nity to meet adverse evidence. It makes a mockery of that purpose
to suggest that such adverse evidence can be effectively met if its
provenance is unknown. Nor is it possible to be confident that a
"resum6 is fair" when one cannot know what it is a r~sum6 of."6
In any event, the Nugent case has been adhered to.97 The only impor-
tant challenge has been a contention that the decision in Jencks v.
United States-s should entitle an applicant for classification as a con-
scientious objector to have access to the investigative reports of the
FBI which are adverse to his claim. This argument has to date been
rejected2
Applicants for Passports
Until the spring of 1958 the passport regulations of the Department
of State provided that passports should not be issued to United States
citizens who were believed to be members or supporters of the Commu-
nist Party, or when it appeared to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
State that the applicant's activities abroad would violate the laws of
the United States, be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign re-
lations, or be otherwise prejudicial to the interests of the United
States. 0 Elsewhere in the regulations provision is made for an ad-
ministrative hearing on behalf of the applicant before the Board of
Passport Appeals, but that hearing has been described as "seriously
deficient in that it fails to assure every applicant of the meaningful
kind of hearing on which Anglo-American legal traditions are so
largely premised."',' Specifically, the defects which are here relevant
consist of the failure on some occasions to state the reasons for denial
96. Id. at 13. Justices Douglas and Black dissented specifically on the con-
stitutional issue. "A hearing at which these faceless people are allowed to pre-
sent their whispered rumors and yet escape the test of torture of cross-examina-
tion is not a hearing in the Anglo-American sense." Ibid.
97. The Court has further particularized its insistence that the r~sum6 of the
FBI investigative report be a fair one, but without modification of the position in
the Nugent case that confrontation could be denied. Simmons v. United States,
348 U.S. 397 (1955). See also Carnes v. United States, 260 F.2d 341 (6th Cir.
1958); Manke v. United States, 259 F.2d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1958).
98. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
99. Bouziden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 927 (1958); Note, 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 754 (1958).
100. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135, 51.136 (Supp. 1958).
101. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Freedom to Travel,
Report of the Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures 49 (1958).
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"with sufficient specificity" and the fact that "no satisfactory stand-
ard is fixed for the disclosure of evidence and the confrontation of
witnesses in hearings before the Board." 10 2
In Kent v. Dulles"03 and Dayton v. Dulles04 the Supreme Court,
recognizing that the citizen's right to travel abroad is protected by the
Constitution, held that Congress had not authorized the Secretary of
State to withhold passports on reason to believe that an applicant was
a member or supporter of the Communist Party. But no decision was
necessary as to other bases for passport refusal, which were not raised
in the cases before the Court. And, although the denial-of-confronta-
tion issue was specifically raised in the Dayton case, the Court found
it unnecessary to reach the question. The constitutionality of the pre-
sumably continuing practice of nonconfrontation where confidential
data or informants are involved thus remains, so far as the Supreme
Court is concerned, an open question. The issue is again one of fair-
ness not notably different in qualitative content from the due process
question raised in the other cases of governmental denial of confron-
tation already discussed.
Nonfederal Denials of Confrontation
The immediately preceding sections of this article have undertaken
to describe briefly the various administrative programs conducted at
the present time by the federal government in which there may be less
than complete notice of charges upon the basis of which adverse ac-
tion may be taken, and in which there may be no opportunity for con-
frontation of witnesses whose adverse statements are considered in
arriving at a decision. It would of course be inaccurate to claim com-
pleteness of coverage or comprehensiveness of description of the pro-
grams thus briefly examined. However, it is believed that the ques-
tions of constitutionality and fairness, even to a large extent as well
questions of wisdom, are consistently the same in each of these pro-
grams, at least in relation to the elements of a due process hearing,
fair notice, and adequate opportunity to cross-examine. The stated
limits of the study must, however, be specifically noted. No attempt is
made here to analyze various state administrative programs in which
full confrontation as the term is here used may not be accorded. Two
contrasting reasons support the decision against complete coverage.
In the first place, the state cases involving denial of confrontation are
too diverse for generalized treatment, particularly in that they are not
by any means all motivated by questions of national security. Second,
102. Ibid.
103. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
104. 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
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even if it were possible to explain in detail the different instances of
state refusal to accord full confrontation, these additional instances
would not alter the central argument. Where the issue is one of basic
fairness, as it is in this connection, it should make no difference
whether the constitutional standard is found in the due process clause
of the fifth amendment or of the fourteenth. Nonetheless, since the
test of fairness here has been linked in part to the basic requirements
of cross-examination inherent in the hearsay rule, it is appropriate to
note some special situations in which, as exceptions to the hearsay
rule, the right of cross-examination has often been held unnecessary.
As already pointed out, Dean Wigmore stoutly insisted on the need
for cross-examination, whether as a matter of constitutional necessity
in criminal proceedings or as a matter of procedural fairness mani-
fested in civil proceedings by the rule against hearsay. 05 The carry-
over of the common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as dying
declarations and former testimony, as exceptions likewise to the con-
stitutional requirement has also been observed. 1 6 But here it is proper
to call attention to other exceptions which Wigmore believed appropri-
ate because of some special aspect of the proceedings: disbarment pro-
ceedings, contempt proceedings, and deportation proceedings."' 7 To
these might now be added other commonly recognized exceptions,
sentencing procedures and proceedings relating to suspension of sen-
tence by reason of insanity. Of these five, only deportation proceedings
are discussed in this article because they alone are exclusively federal
and because the denial of confrontation in deportation cases typically
involves loyalty-security matters. It is believed that Dean Wigmore
was wrong in thinking a due process type hearing was not called for
in such a case. The single case which he cites'08 should be overruled
for reasons subsequently to be discussed. Brief comments must here
suffice as to the remaining four problems.
(1) As already indicated, state disbarment proceedings are not here
discussed because they raise somewhat different problems, involving
also the whole question of issuance of licenses.1° However, it should
be noted that there is considerable authority for the proposition that
the obviously serious consequences of a disbarment proceeding make
necessary the essentials of a full and fair hearing, including the right
of cross-examination. 10
105. See text at notes 6-11 supra.
106. See text at notes 7-8 supra.
107. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1398. See also note 11 supra.
108. Singh v. District Director, 96 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1938).
109. See Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints c. 3
(1956).
110. See Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123
(1926) ; In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Society, 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954).
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(2) Contempt proceedings also present special problems, and per-
haps as well unique justifications, for dispensing with cross-examina-
tion. The only circumstances in which confrontation appears not to
have been required in cases of criminal contempt are those in which
the alleged acts of contempt took place in the presence of the judge so
that a summary citation may be proper without jury trial or the hear-
ing of other witnesses.:1
(3) Where a judge, after defendant's conviction in a jury trial,
examines expert witnesses and considers reports on an ex parte basis
in determining a sentence which is within his sole discretion, the situa-
tion is surely not the same as those which are the principal concern of
this article. The failure of confrontation in the sentencing situation
may be perfectly justifiable, as was held to be the case in Williams v.
New York.1 2 As the Court said,
modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the
more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an oppor-
tunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to
the trial. 13
(4) Similarly, a governor's ex parte consideration of medical evi-
dence in determining whether to exercise his discretion to postpone
execution of a prisoner claimed to be insane is very different from the
cases previously dealt with."4 Justice Black explained that difference
succinctly in distinguishing these cases from the Attorney General's
delegation to a subordinate of a power to make an ex parte determina-
tion whether to suspend deportation of an alien.
The Court disposes of what has been done to Jay to its satisfac-
tion by saying that his right to stay here if he proves he is a good
citizen "comes as an act of grace," like "probation or suspension
of criminal sentence." But probation and suspension of criminal
sentence come only after conviction of crime. Cf. Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241. Here the Government with all of its resources
has not been able to prove that Jay ever committed a crime of any
kind.: 5
Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1866); In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951). See also 1 Davis, Administrative Law §§ 7.18-.19
(1958).
111. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 42.
112. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
113. Id. at 247.
114. See Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958); Solesbee v. Balkcom,
339 U.S. 9 (1950). But see the dissents of Justice Frankfurter, 357 U.S. at 552,
558-59; 339 U.S. at 14.
115. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 366-67 (1956) (Justice Black, dissenting
opinion).
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B. In the Name of National Secuority
There can be no escaping the fact that the so-called cold war is a
period of serious national jeopardy; and of course the war power per-
mits exigent action to meet the danger in the ways that seem most
appropriate. As the estimate of danger becomes very high, it may
even be that limitations can be placed upon the exercise of some of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights, even upon freedom of speech and
association.,' But this is only upon a showing that the danger is
reasonably clear and imminent. Moreover, only "advocacy of that
which incites to illegal action" is forbidden so that punishment can
fall upon persons who incite to action, but not upon those who think,
believe, join, or even those who advocate abstract doctrine. m7 Finally,
and most significantly, there has been permitted no relaxation of pro-
cedural standards in these most critical cases where advocacy of over-
throw of the Government of the United States is charged. Is it not
curious, then, that in the cases where no such serious charge is made,2"8
the normal elements of procedural due process should be denied?
Notice the reasons that have heretofore been thought sufficient: First,
national security forbids the disclosure to the person charged with dis-
loyalty or as a security risk of anything more than a more or less in-
complete, and typically rather general summary of the adverse in-
formation. Almost never is there anything more; there seem to be no
degrees of necessity for confidentiality-all information is equally
cloaked in the mantle of secrecy. Second, since these proceedings are
typically administrative in form, and not criminal in nature, the con-
stitutional requirements of fair notice and opportunity for cross-ex-
amination are said to be inapplicable.
This part of this article, it is hoped, will show that the need for se-
crecy has been over-emphasized; and in part C below, the writer will
suggest why he believes that in any event the existing procedures fail
to satisfy the procedural due process requirements of the Constitution.
National Security and the Communist Conspiracy
The cold war is real, it is intense, and there is genuine danger. The
resulting sense of national insecurity is the product principally of the
external threat to world peace inherent in the international Commu-
nist conspiracy and the internal danger of subversion. This conclusion
116. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Cf. Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
117. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 313, 318 (1957).
118. Presumably, if a government employee should be thought guilty of Smith
Act violation, for example, he would be prosecuted for that criminal offense
rather than proceeded against indirectly under the loyalty-security standards for
discharge.
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has been recognized repeatedly by Congress,:"' the President, 120 and
the Supreme Court.' 21 Accordingly, the government not only acts
properly, but would be remiss in doing otherwise, when it uses every
energy at its command to combat the danger and frustrate the potential
enemy. The various loyalty-security programs are products of this
concern over internal security. They are premised upon the proper
assumption that the government should not employ initially, and need
not keep in its employment, any person who is not loyal to the United
States. And indeed it has always been assumed that the heads of de-
partments and agencies in the executive branch of the government are
at liberty to hire and fire at will in the absence of statutory limita-
tions. 2 2 Such limitations were contained in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
of 1912,'123 providing for notice and opportunity to reply in writing, but
no hearing; and in the Veterans Preference Act of 1944124 certain
employees were given additional procedural rights including a right of
appeal to the Civil Service Commission. However, when discharges
were contemplated on loyalty or security grounds rather than because
of budget-required reductions in force or for inefficiency, it was recog-
nized that some kind of hearing must be provided. The reason must
have arisen from recognition of the obvious fact that a loyalty or se-
curity discharge involves a penalty even though perhaps not in the
technical criminal sense.1 25
119. E.g., 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952) (congressional finding
of necessity for the Internal Security Act of 1950); 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50
U.S.C. § 841 (Supp. 1954). "The Congress hereby finds and declares that the
Communist Party of the United States, although purportedly a political party,
is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the
United States."
120. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1959, p. 1, col. 8; id., April 5, 1959, p. 1,
col. 8; any press conference; or any message to Congress.
121. See, e.g., the several opinions in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
122. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903); Reagan v. United States,
182 U.S. 419 (1901). See also Emerson and Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government
Employees, 58 Yale L.J. 1, 98-99 (1948).
123. 37 Stat. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1952).
124. 58 Stat. 390 (1944), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952).
125. In Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945), the Court took this ap-
proach on a parallel issue in a deportation case. "Though deportation is not
technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual
and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.
That deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious one-cannot be doubted.
Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of
that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness." See also Schneider-
man v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943). Cf. Lovett v. United States,
328 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946).
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The critical question was, what kind of hearing must be given? On
the one hand was the need for fairness to the individual, and on the
other the strongly asserted need to disclose nothing that might be
detrimental to the national security. The resolution of this potential
conflict was in every case to be decided in favor of protecting the na-
tional security, even if it involved some or a very large sacrifice of
fairness to the individual. Even apart from the question, discussed
in part C below, whether this result was constitutionally defensible, a
threshold question requires more examination than it has received.
That is an inquiry into how the national security stakes at issue may
be fairly assessed to determine in each case what is the maximum dis-
closure which can be offered without risking national security. The
facile, but logically insufficient, solution to this difficult question has
been in virtually all circumstances to leave the determination as to
what may be disclosed to the sole discretion of the governmental
agency charged with protection of national security. Quite naturally,
the decision has been in favor of nondisclosure. An alternative, favor-
ing disclosure of witnesses who prefer anonymity and of internal in-
vestigative reports, should scarcely be expected from any agency
charged with the protection of internal security interests of the United
States, and not called upon to perform the essentially judicial function
of preserving individual rights.
Perhaps less readily understandable is the fact that the govern-
mental agencies responsible for the preservation of national security
have been unwilling to rely on the trustworthiness and loyalty of other
government personnel, such as members of loyalty review boards and
members of the federal judiciary. Nevertheless, this has been the case:
review board personnel and even federal judges have been called upon
to accept investigative summaries of undisclosed evidence from undis-
closed sources. Wherever a challenge has been made to the policy of
nondisclosure, either in principle or in a particular case, the possi-
bility of informed discussion has been precluded in advance by the
very policy at issue. The magic formula has always been "national se-
curity" beyond which trespass is forbidden. Thus, even where con-
scientious study has been undertaken by governmental commission 2
or fair-minded bar association '127 this assertion of national security
has finally been the barrier beyond which no progress could be made.
126. The Commission on Government Security, acting pursuant to Act of Con-
gress, concluded on this issue: "The Commission recommends that confrontation
and cross-examination be extended to persons subject to loyalty investigations
whenever it can be done without endangering the national security." Report of
the Commission on Government Security xviii (1957). The definition of "en-
dangering the national security" is left to the investigative agencies.
127. The Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York concluded in part as follows:
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In the absence of specific data to show the national security dangers
which would result from disclosure in individual cases or classes of
cases, the outside observer has two choices: The way of caution is to
accept without demonstration the claims of the investigative agencies.
As already pointed out, other governmental agencies, including the
review boards themselves, citizen inquiry groups, and even the federal
courts, have in general taken this quiescent position. The only alterna-
tive course for a person who believes that individual fairness is being
unnecessarily sacrificed is to seek to show by reasoned conclusions that
the policy of secrecy conceals more than is required even in the interest
of the national security thereby sought to be protected.
In pursuit of this second approach, it is necessary first to note how
the investigative agencies operate in the national security area and
what they seek to protect by nondisclosure. The principal investigative
agency is, of course, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and its di-
rector, J. Edgar Hoover, is its most authoritative spokesman. In ap-
pearing before the Loyalty Review Board operating under Executive
Order 9835, he made the following statement:
Now as to the matter of confidential informants. That, of
course, is a problem that you have to pass on. I just want to out-
line to you gentlemen the three types of informants that we have
contact with. The first type is what we call the top secret or
highly confidential informant. Under no circumstances will we
disclose his identity. That informant is one who may be in high
rank in the Communist Party. It has been necessary for us to
have informants in some of the higher subversive movements in
the country. Those informants may have furnished us informa-
tion concerning certain individuals who are now employed in the
Government service, and consequently, when we initiate the in-
vestigation we may find that John Doe, an employee of the De-
partment of Agriculture, has been reported by such confidential
informant as having been a member of the Party, having Com-
munist membership card so-and-so. That information would be
included in the report to the employing agency. To identify that
informant would destroy the informant for our subsequent work.
It would very likely imperil the informant's life.
"[3] It should be the policy of the government to permit the employee to
cross-examine adverse witnesses before a hearing board when the hearing board
believes this important for the development of the facts, unless the disclosure
of the identity of the witness or requiring him to submit to cross-examination
would be injurious to national security.
"[4] The identity of an informant who regularly provides or is employed to
provide secret information should not be disclosed by requiring his appearance
before a screening board or a hearing board or otherwise identifying him, when-
ever the head of the department or agency which obtained such information shall
certify that the identification or presence of such an informant would be det-
rimental to the interests of national security." New York Report 174.
Washington University Open Scholarship
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
The second type of informant is what we call the contact; that
is, a person that we would not employ. It would be a professional
man, a banker, a lawyer, a doctor, or some person of high stand-
ing in the community with whom we have had contacts for many
years and who would not accept Government employment, but
who is an outstanding, reliable source.... So we would record that
confidential informant T-1 or T-2 has advised as follows. We
would evaluate the informant by saying he is a leading member of
the New York bar, and we can vouch for his thorough reliability.
When that type of man gives us information in confidence, we
of course are going to treat it in confidence.
The third type of informant is the next-door neighbor or fellow
employee. Many times in many other types of investigations fel-
low employees will come in and give us information concerning
some other employee in their office. It may be a superior officer.
On some occasions he insists that his identity be treated in con-
fidence. We endeavor to try to find out whether he is activated by
malice, and, if he is, we try to explore that and establish the back-
ground for his hostility. He may be somewhat hysterical or over-
wrought as to some matter of administrative procedure that he
may think he has been the victim of. Those are necessarily the
functions of an investigator in interviewing a person like that.
But if that person says he wants to be kept confidential we must
not use his name. We will ask these employees as to whether they
are willing to make a signed statement. If they will not make a
signed statement, we will reflect that in our report, and that is for
the evaluation by the loyalty board and the employing agency. We
ask the employee if he would be willing to testify. If he says he
will not, we observe that reaction and put that in the report.
Now the only other alternative that we have in that situation
is a matter of policy for this committee to determine.... And if
you decide that we should follow it, we will. We will instruct our
agents that before they go in to interview that they advise the
person that anything he says he must be prepared to testify to. I
frankly don't believe we will get any information that way ....
The function of the Bureau is a fact gathering and fact finding
agency. We intend merely to get the information to run down
allegations of disloyalty and to incorporate them in our records,
giving the sources of information where it will not affect the se-
curity of our country. But, where the person giving us informa-
tion insists upon being treated as confidential, we will not give the
source of the information....
There has been some criticism and comment, I am told, about
these designations of T-1, T-2, etc. I think it is a very simple
problem. If it is the desire of this Board that the identity of con-
fidential informants be given, I am perfectly willing to advise
everyone in advance that they must be ready to testify. If they
won't give it to us under those circumstances, we won't take the
information. We can't afford, in the Bureau, to violate confi-
dences.'!
128. Quoted in Report of the Commission on Government Security 657-58
(1957).
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In addition to the above statement, Mr. Hoover has testifiedl- and
written13° extensively in support of the principle of nondisclosure. The
justifications seem to be the following:
1. Identification of Informants. The first step of the argument is
that if confrontation is required, the names of confidential informants
will be revealed. This is of course true wherever the loyalty-security
case can be established only with the testimony of such an informant.
But the argument implies more disclosure than is implicit in the com-
mand of confrontation. The government would not be required to dis-
close military secrets, scientific processes, or indeed anything it might
choose to withhold. The government would not even be obliged to
offer as witnesses those persons who preferred to remain anonymous,
so long as their statements led to other witnesses or other evidence
which could be offered in support of the charges. It seems not un-
reasonable to conclude that if the derogatory information offered by
the confidential informants could not be corroborated by other evi-
dence sufficient to cast some doubt on the security reliability of a gov-
ernment employee, it should ordinarily be disregarded as of little pro-
bative value. After all, there is no requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. To raise doubts as to whether
continued employment is "clearly consistent with the interests of na-
tional security" does not require a very substantial showing. But it
does seem proper that there appear on the open record some evidence
to support such a conclusion, and evidence which the subject of the
charges may answer, including the right of cross-examination where
appropriate.
Moreover, there is no indication from the FBI of the number of
prospective confidential informants who are more reluctant to appear
as witnesses in loyalty-security proceedings than is any person reluc-
tant to testify in ordinary civil or criminal proceedings. Does the non-
production of these potential witnesses not suggest too great a solici-
tude for their sensibilities as compared to the serious charges which
129. E.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee on Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1949, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess., 245-47 (1948); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations on the subject of State Department Employee
Loyalty Investigations pursuant to S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
327-28 (1949).
130. Book: Masters of Deceit (1958). Articles: Civil Liberties and Law En-
forcement: The Role of the FBI, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 175 (1952); The Confidential
Nature of FBI Reports, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (1956); A Comment on the Article
"Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58 Yale L.J. 401 (1949). See also
Whitehead, The FBI Story (1956); Richardson, The Federal Employee Loyalty
Program, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 546 (1951). For a different view, see Cook, The
FBI, 187 The Nation 222 (Oct. 18, 1958).
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they anonymously advance? All must admit that the assurance that
an informant's identity will never be revealed is calculated to attract
unverifiable gossip, malicious talebearing, and downright falsification.
There is no reliable way of sorting out the false from the true except
through the time-tested device of cross-examination.
It is also contended that the disclosure of names will dry up sources
of information. But this need not be the case. The government is free
to assure nondisclosure to any person who gives information if it can-
not be received on any other terms. The agency receiving information
on such a condition might well have special reason by that very fact to
be alert for error or falsehood. What the government would not be free
to do, if confrontation should be required, would be to allow the use
without cross-examination of the summarized statements of any per-
son available as a witness, but not called. Mr. Hoover indicated in his
statement quoted above that his only alternative would be to tell all
persons who came to the FBI that a requested confidence could not be
protected. If the FBI found it necessary to assure anonymity, stories
could be accepted for verification from other sources. Indeed, this is
almost precisely what is done at the present time by the FBI in the
use of the wiretapping technique. As Mr. Hoover has pointed out on
another occasion, as of August 1, 1956, there were ninety wiretaps in
operation by the FBI 3 ' although the wiretaps themselves could not be
admitted into evidence in federal courts.132 Nevertheless, the FBI con-
sidered these to be vital in protecting the nation not only against
dangers to its national security, but as well in connection with the
detection of certain kinds of nonsecurity crime. Moreover, where the
only barrier to the testimony of an informant before an administrative
board is a prior agreement that the report will be held confidential, one
can imagine that the FBI would be an effective advocate in persuading
the individual to testify if in reality there were no other way to protect
against a disloyal person having access to government secrets.
An alternative argument is that the disclosure of informants regu-
larly employed by the FBI would render them subsequently useless to
the government and might even endanger their lives. Again, as before
stated, it seems clear that it would be the rare case in which the testi-
mony of a particular informant would be indispensable. But if indeed
his story was not elsewhere corroborated, the demands of fairness
131. Hoover, The Confidential Nature of FBI Reports, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 1,
6 (1956).
132. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Indeed, leads gained
from wiretapping, "fruit of the poisonous tree," are also not admissible in federal
courts. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Cf. Benanti v.
United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
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would even more clearly require that the informant's tale be properly
tested in the only possible way, through cross-examination. This seems
especially true in view of the unfortunate indications of unreliability
on the part of an appreciable number of regularly employed inform-
ants who were apparently regarded by the FBI as "sources known to
be reliable.' '133
As to the fear for the safety of the informants, no data have been
offered to establish that there is danger, despite the fact that, in prepa-
ration for the first Communist trial under the Smith Act,1 34 the FBI
used as witnesses thirty-eight informants never before disclosed;1"
and there is no report of reprisal against any of these. One would be
reluctant to believe that the FBI would be unable to give as effective
protection to informants in loyalty-security proceedings as it habit-
ually does in behalf of those who testify in criminal proceedings. This
argument, even if seriously advanced, scarcely outweighs the opposing
interest in fairness to the persons informed against.
A.final item should be noted in connection with the reluctance to
disclose names and to use informants as witnesses. That is the fact
that there are informants and there are informants. As Mr. Hoover
pointed out in his statement before the Loyalty Review Board, there
may be as many as three distinct categories of informants: regularly
employed confidential agents, reliable contacts, and casual informants.
Whatever may be the practical considerations which motivate the
withholding of the identities of regularly employed informants, those
reasons tend to vanish as to "contacts," however reliable they may be,
and other informants of the neighbor, fellow-employee, and acquaint-
ance class. As to all such "casual" informants, as those not in the
business of informing are ordinarily described, there should be no
realistic problem of drying up sources. It should not be lightly as-
sumed that such individuals, who have a one-shot, or, at best, occa-
sional, story to tell, will be unwilling to reveal their honest doubts
about disloyalty or security risk indications among neighbors, fellow-
employees, or social acquaintances. The normally accepted obligations
of citizenship would suffice in most cases to prompt revelation. In par-
ticular, it seems unlikely that such a casual informant, whether one
who volunteers information or one who answers the questions of an
FBI agent, would bargain for a guarantee of nondisclosure as a con-
133. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115(1956). See also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Mesarosh v.
United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956). Cf. Justice Frankfurter's memorandum in
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 808, 811 (1956).
134. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
135. Hoover, The Confidential Nature of FBI Reports, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 1,
7 (1956).
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dition of giving the information. It seems more reasonable to believe
that such immunity from disclosure is a kind of bonus offered to the
person interviewed. Whatever may be the facts in this necessarily
conjectural area, the FBI draws little if any distinction either in prac-
tice or in justification between the paid informer and the casual in-
former. In this connection it is notable that both the Commission on
Government Security ", and the Special Committee of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York 137 concluded that full confronta-
tion should be provided in the case of casual informants. The practice,
unfortunately, seems not to have been altered. In any event, as will be
noted in part C below, the failure to disclose any informant, whether
casual or regularly employed, raises serious doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of such a hearing.
2. Revelation of Confidential Investigative Techniques. A second
main argument advanced by the FBI in defense of its established prac-
tice of nondisclosure in administrative proceedings involving loyalty-
security questions is that disclosure of the names of regular inform-
ants would not only destroy their individual usefulness in further in-
formation-gathering, as noted above, but might also endanger other
operatives or even jeopardize the structure of investigative techniques.
If there is any difference between this argument and the contention
that disclosure of names would dry up sources, the difference is one of
degree only. Once more, in the name of national security, we are not
offered illustrations or explanation; rather we are asked to accept as
fact what seems at best logically dubious. One can only wonder what
are the consequences of disclosure of a single informant's name other
than the conceded fact that his own usefulness will be impaired or
even destroyed; what the implied chain of consequences may be is left
to the speculation of the observer who, in this case, does not know.
J. Prejudice to Innocent Parties Named in the Reports. The con-
tention is made that disclosure of unverified investigative reports
would often be prejudicial to persons named therein, but against whom
no charges are contemplated. This is a perfectly sound reason for not
revealing investigative reports as such out of the context of a trial or
other proper proceeding. But to argue from this that the same reports,
with or without independent verification, may be used as evidence of
disloyalty without a testing by cross-examination is an impossibly long
jump. In fact, the suggestion is at least implicit in this line of argu-
ment that verification or discrediting of charges and rumors can be
most effectively done by the FBI through further inquiry and investi-
136. Report of the Commission on Government Security xviii (1957).
137. New York Report 174-75.
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gation.13 8 We can be grateful that the FBI is properly reluctant to
turn out such random reports without whatever verification is avail-
able to the Bureau. However, that is far from conceding, as seems to
be suggested, that such checking by FBI agents is superior to the
rigorous search for truth that can be promoted by searching cross-
examination. Perhaps the contention, which is at best ambiguously
made, is misunderstood. At least, as here stated, it has no merit.
Unfairness Compounded
As shown above, even the so-called practical arguments favoring the
nondisclosure of evidence and witnesses are of doubtful merit. It re-
mains to outline the opposing factors which demonstrate the particular
injustice of denying confrontation in loyalty-security proceedings. 131
In addition to all the usual reasons for which cross-examination has
long been recognized as the best vehicle for the ascertainment of truth,
there are special considerations which relate peculiarly to loyalty-
security hearings.
(1) Security charges often deal with events in the distant past.
Moreover, the crucial charges often relate to events that may not have
seemed terribly important to the participant when they occurred, such
as a recital of meetings allegedly attended or of statements reputedly
made many years earlier. Without an opportunity to learn from cross-
examination the specific details and the relevant context, the subject
of the charges is helpless to answer effectively, even to show mistaken
identity.
(2) Charges in loyalty-security proceedings often relate to atti-
tudes, beliefs, and even the ultimate in subjectivity, states of mind. A
person identified with disloyal thoughts or associations is peculiarly
disabled from purging himself of charges which he can answer only
with a general denial. Moreover, the witnesses who might affirma-
tively assist in refutation may themselves be reluctant to identify their
own activities or associations of another day. Since they are ordinarily
not compellable by subpoena on behalf of the accused, he is again un-
able to defend effectively. Indeed, the very informants often sought to
be concealed are persons who may themselves at one time have had con-
nection with subversive causes. The unreliability of some of these in-
formants has already been demonstrated.1 40
(3) In most proceedings involving loyalty-security issues the se-
curity-risk suspect carries the difficult burden of establishing that his
138. See Hoover, The Confidential Nature of FBI Reports, 8 Syracuse L. Rev.
1, 4-5 (1956).
139. For a more complete statement, see Brief for Petitioner, pp. 29-38, Taylor
v. McElroy (No. 504, Oct. Term 1958).
140. See note 133 supra.
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continued employment (or whatever may be the issue) is "clearly con-
sistent with the interests of national security." Where, as here, his
cause is lost if even a doubt remains in the minds of the screening
board, the burden becomes almost impossible to sustain in the absence
of an opportunity to meet and make effective refutation of the evi-
dence considered against him.
(4) Finally, the proceedings become almost meaningless when the
triers of the fact of loyalty or security themselves are not allowed to
know the evidence upon which the decision must be made. Even the
most conscientiously impartial summary is scarcely an adequate sub-
stitute for direct testimony subject to cross-examination.
C. Confrontation and Due Process
Without exception the existing federal programs in which loyalty
and security issues may be raised provide for some kind of hearing.
There appear to be at least three assumptions implicit in connection
with the provisions for hearing. (1) It is apparently taken for granted
that some kind of hearing must be provided as a constitutional neces-
sity. Whatever may be permissible so far as ordinary refusals to hire
or discharges for reasons unrelated to national security considerations,
at least the government is not free to identify a person as unworthy
of the trust of his government without some opportunity to answer.
(2) The tendency is to provide for as specific notice of the charges and
as much identification of adverse evidence and witnesses as is thought
to be "consistent with the interests of national security," a phrase left
magnificently undefined except in the conscience of the investigative
agencies and the review boards. (3) Uneasiness over the failure to
provide cross-examination opportunities is reflected in the caution
typically pressed upon the review boards to take into account the fact
that the subject of the investigation is thus handicapped in the prepa-
ration and presentation of his defense. All of which is simply another
way of suggesting that the governmental sense of injustice is dis-
turbed by the denial of rights that are taken as a matter of course in
all criminal proceedings and in all other civil proceedings. In Part B
above an attempt was made to demonstrate by reasoning-the relevant
factual data being unavailable-that the entirely proper concern for
security has in this context resulted in unnecessary and inappropriate
safeguards. If the writer is correct in assuming that the responsible
government officials would prefer to afford complete confrontation if
they could be convinced that in doing so they would not jeopardize na-
tional security, then it is hoped that the above analysis will contribute
to an understanding of how fairness can be promoted without peril
to national security.
Even if the foregoing assumptions and reasoning lead to an errone-
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ous conclusion, however, the matter does not end with a reluctant en-
dorsement of the existing restrictive practices. More important is the
conclusion that the present practice of nondisclosure is a denial of
procedural due process in that the adumbrated hearings provided are
not hearings in any meaningful constitutional sense. Accordingly, it
is the purpose of this part to make the constitutional argument. Three
principal contentions are advanced in support of the existing program,
all of which are believed to be insufficient to overcome the ordinary due
process requirement. First, since these are administrative rather than
criminal proceedings, the sixth amendment does not require confronta-
tion either directly or as a requirement of fifth amendment due proc-
ess. Second, government employment, issuance of a passport, etc. are
privileges and not rights so that no constitutional questions arise in
connection with their grant, denial, or withdrawal. Third, the exer-
cise of the war power to protect national security justifies limitations
on what would otherwise be required by the concept of due process.
Each argument merits answering.
Confrontation in Administrative Proceedings
It has already been pointed out in Part II above that, while con-
frontation as a specific constitutional mandate of the sixth amend-
ment applies only to proceedings in the federal courts, the sense of
fairness which impelled its inclusion there has logically carried over
the same guarantee into criminal proceedings in state courts and in all
civil proceedings except the kind here under review. The argument
that, since these proceedings are not criminal, no confrontation is re-
quired (however desirable it may be), proves at once too much and
too little. It proves too much in the sense that if this conclusion were
really sound, then the strictures of the hearsay rule would have no con-
stitutional place in civil proceedings. But that is just not so. To the
extent that fairness forbids hearsay, the rule has a perfectly sound
constitutional base. To be sure, legislatures and courts may vary the
detail of the hearsay rule as it may be applicable in particular cir-
cumstances. For example, section 7(c) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act specifically provides that
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every
agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of ir-
relevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence .... 141
On the basis of this rule much evidence which would be barred in
ordinary litigation in the civil courts may be admitted and used in
support of a finding, "if it is of a kind on which fair-minded men are
141. Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c)
(1952).
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accustomed to rely in serious matters .... ,,1142 It is significant, however,
that section 7 (c) also provides
Every party shall have the right to present his case or defense by
oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and
true disclosure of the facts.143
Without such assurance of the right of cross-examination to promote
fairness, the relaxation of the hearsay rule would presumably not have
withstood constitutional attack. Clearly, the relaxation to this limited
extent of the hearsay prohibitions is not to say that the APA was in-
tended to permit the use of evidence that is not identified as to source,
is not made available to the party against whom it is used, and is not
even available to the scrutiny of the trier of the facts or the reviewing
court. Yet this is exactly what is sought to be defended in the context
of loyalty-security determinations.
It might be argued that, since such proceedings are not in any
event subject to the requirements of the APA,244 the evidentiary stand-
ards may be still further relaxed. But this would not seem to be true.
If, as has been already pointed out, the essence of the hearsay rule
incorporates the concept of fairness, it should follow that a complete
relinquishment of that essential and salutary feature of the rule would
constitute a denial of due process. A hearing in which these funda-
mental concepts of fairness are disregarded is not merely an in-
sufficient hearing-it is no hearing. Perhaps it is worse than no
hearing, since persons not privy to the procedures employed at the
so-called hearing may be misled into believing that its finding repre-
sents an informed judgment similar in reliability to judgments handed
down regularly in the civil courts or in other administrative proceed-
ings. Thus, the person against whom an adverse decision is rendered
is stamped, perhaps permanently, with an unanswered and unan-
swerable charge equivalent in the popular mind to disloyalty.
To say that confrontation is not required in loyalty-security cases
because they are not criminal proceedings also proves too little. In
fact, it misses altogether the point that confrontation is not only a
specific command of the sixth amendment in criminal proceedings;
in addition, the burden of this article has been to show that at least
the cross-examination aspects of confrontation are so intimately bound
up with traditional notions of fairness that cross-examination may
142. Ellers v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 132 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1943). See
also 2 Davis, Administrative Law §§ 14.01-.17 (1958).
143. Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1006 (c) (1952).
144. Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004
(1952).
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not be denied where the charge involves such vital issues as charges
of disloyalty.
It is right and natural that a person who is in fact disloyal to his
country should be despised as untrustvorthy. Scarcely less odium
attaches to the man who is denied clearance because he is a "security
risk." Accordingly, although it is technically true that denials of
clearance are not criminal proceedings in so far as neither prison
sentences nor fines are imposed, the substantive distinction between
the criminal and the noncriminal disappears. It is cruel irony, then,
that on such a subtlety a man may be branded disloyal without any
of the procedural safeguards of which Anglo-American jurisprudence
is so justly proud. Surely it cannot be said in any meaningful sense
of the word that this is due process.
Privileges, Rights, and Confrontation
It has long been a comfortable rationalization for skimping on hear-
ing procedures in connection with government employment or other
"favors" dispensed at the discretion of government to say these are
mere matters of privilege. Accordingly, so the argument runs, the
privilege of employment may be conferred or withdrawn without
regard to the amenities of due process. This conception has had re-
curring acceptance since it was given its most pungent statement by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking in 1892 for the Massachusetts court:
"the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."'", The same idea
was carried over uncritically into the loyalty-security context by
Judge Prettyman in Bailey v. Richardson, when he said that "due
process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of some-
thing to which he has a right.'14 But, as Professor Clark Byse has
pointed out, "suffice it to note that 'privilege' is simply a label which
expresses a conclusion reached on other grounds; it tells us nothing
about the reasons, if any, for the conclusion.', 47 The correctness of
this judgment is reinforced by recent Supreme Court decisions rec-
ognizing that public employment is a right which may not be taken
away except by proper procedures. In Wieman v. Updegraff the Court
stated:
145. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517
(1892).
146. 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951). See also Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
147. Byse, Opportunity to Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev.
57, 69 (1952). But cf. 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 7.11 (1958).
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We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion
pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.48
Similarly, in Slochower v. Board of Educ. the Court reasserted the
same concept:
To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to
government employment is only to say that he must comply with
reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by
the proper authorities.'"
Clearly, the simplistic privilege-right dichotomy of the Bailey case
has been rejected.
National Security and the Dilution of Procedural Due Process
The Supreme Court seems never to have held that the qualitative
content of procedural due process is subject to variation between cases
in which the limitation is justified on grounds of national security and
cases in which due process limitations are sought to be justified on
other bases. Nor even does the government categorically argue that
procedural due process may be dispensed with in loyalty-security
proceedings. More circumspectly the contention is advanced that
procedural due process is satisfied in these situations where, as a
function of the executive power, confrontation is not accorded. Per-
haps an analogy is sought to be drawn from the relativistic or balanc-
ing-of-evils position adopted by the Court in modern applications
of the "clear and present danger test." As Chief Justice Vinson re-
phrased the classic Holmes-Brandeis formula for determining the
extent of permissible limitation on first amendment rights, it does
indeed become a kind of balancing of the seriousness of the threatened
danger against the value attached, for example, to freedom of speech.
Thus, Vinson, adopting the language of Judge Learned Hand in the
court below, said in Dennis v. United States:
148. 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952).
149. 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956). See also United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) ; Pike v. Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 625 (1941). Cf. Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hosp., 286 App.
Div. 542, 547, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534, 538 (1955).
See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958): "To experienced
lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit-and hence the vindica-
tion of legal rights--depends more often on how the factfinder appraises the facts
than on a disputed construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of prece-
dents. Thus the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined assume
an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be
applied. And the more important the rights at stake the more important must be
the procedural safeguards surrounding those rights." Thus, where substantive
rights of the first importance are involved, such as loss of employment on the
implicit charge of disloyalty, the procedural protections must be of the highest
order.
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In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the "evil,"
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.1'0
The difficulty of analogizing this approach to the problems involved
in limiting confrontation is that the "clear and present danger" test,
whether in its original or in its revised form, is designed to measure
only the permissible limitations upon substantive due process, as found
particularly in the first and fourteenth amendments. To argue now
the permissibility of the same approach in connection with procedural
due process is to risk complete destruction of the procedural guaran-
tees which constitute the essence of our constitutional structure. At
this point Justice Jackson's words on this score are again relevant.
Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than
substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less




Two principal contentions have been advanced thus far: First, it
has been suggested that confrontation can, as a practical matter, be
supplied in the various administrative proceedings where it is now
denied, without danger to national security. Second, it has been argued
that in any event the refusal of confrontation in the kinds of proceed-
ings here discussed should be recognized as a violation of procedural
due process. It remains now to place these somewhat theoretical
contentions in the setting of specific factual situations. An opportunity
to do exactly that is admirably available in connection with three
cases before the Supreme Court for decision in 1959. Two of the cases
arise under the Industrial Personnel Security Program and one under
the government employee program. All three present more or less
squarely the constitutional question of right to confrontation. How-
ever, since they vary in detail, and because the constitutional issue
may be avoided in some of them, they require separate statement.
Greene v. McElroy'52 is the most important of the cases because it
presents the constitutional question most clearly."'5 Petitioner is a
trained and experienced aeronautical engineer who was, at the time
150. 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting from 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
151. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezel, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953).
See note 33 supra.
152. 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 872 (1958) (No. 180,
Oct. Term 1958).
153. The factual recital is based upon the opinion in the court of appeals and
upon the transcript of record in the Supreme Court; but specific citation is
avoided.
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of his resignation because of denial of clearance, employed at a salary
of $18,000 a year as general manager and vice president in charge
of engineering by the Engineering and Research Corporation (ERCO),
a corporation engaged in classified research under contracts with
the Department of the Navy. Each of the contracts incorporated by
reference the Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for
Safeguarding Classified Matter, which provided as a condition of the
contract an obligation to exclude from access to classified matter em-
ployees to whom clearance was not granted. Twice in 1949 and once
in 1950 petitioner received such clearance. In 1951 petitioner's clear-
ance was withdrawn, but was restored in 1952 after hearing before
the Industrial Employment Review Board. After a change in proce-
dures and standards for clearance in 1953, the Secretary of the Navy
notified ERCO that petitioner's clearance had been withdrawn; and
petitioner resigned. In 1954 he received a statement of charges "to
the extent permitted by security considerations." The thirteen para-
graphs in the statement may be summarized under general headings:
(1) Membership in or relationship with organizations cited as sub-
versive or Communist-front; (2) association with persons known or
thought to be sympathetic with Communist policies, including his first
wife from whom he was divorced in 1947; (3) association with officials
in the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak Embassies; (4) having
Communist publications in his home during the time of his first
marriage. The charges ranged from the vaguely general to the
precisely specific. For example:
4. Many apparently reliable witnesses have testified that during
the period of SUBJECT'S first marriage his personal political
sympathies were in general accord with those of his wife, in that
he was sympathetic towards Russia; followed the Communist
Party "line"; presented "fellow-traveler" arguments; was ap-
parently influenced by "Jean's wild theories"; etc.
6. On 7 April 1947 SUBJECT and his wife Jean attended the
third Annual Dinner of the Southern Conference for Human
Welfare, an organization that has been officially cited as Com-
munist front.11
4
At the hearing the Board presented no witnesses. Thirteen witnesses
testified on behalf of petitioner, and twenty-four exhibits were intro-
duced by him. In his own testimony he denied all the implications
of disloyalty and sympathy to alien causes; and he sought to explain
the circumstances as to all the charges which were factually correct.
This included the story of political difference with his wife contribut-
ing to the 1947 divorce and the explanation that the visits to the
154. Record, pp. 9-11.
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embassies had been in connection with the business interests of ERCO
during and shortly after World War II.
The judical proceedings were instituted in 1954 after an adverse
finding, although the final denial of clearance on administrative review
was not completed until 1956. The suit filed in the district court
sought a declaration that the government's denial of clearance to
petitioner should be declared "illegal, void, and of no effect." After
stipulation of the facts and motions for summary judgment by both
parties, the court granted the government's motion and ordered the
complaint dismissed. The court held that petitioner's loss of employ-
ment resulted simply from ERCO's contractual agreement to abide
by security requirements; that in so acting the government was
acting properly to protect itself against threats to its survival; and
that accordingly petitioner had shown no invasion of his legal rights.
The court of appeals affirmed. Although recognizing the reality of the
injury to petitioner (who by then was employed as an architectural
draftsman at $4,400 a year), the court denied the existence of a
justiciable controversy. Judge Washington concluded:
In a mature democracy, choices such as this must be made by
the executive branch, and not by the judicial. If too many mis-
takes are made, the electorate will in due time reflect its dis-
satisfaction with the results achieved. It would be an unwarranted
interference with the responsibility which the executive alone
should bear, were the judiciary to undertake to determine for
itself whether Greene or any other individual similarly situated
is in fact sufficiently trustworthy to be entitled to security
clearance for a particular project.5 G
Taylor v. McElroy5 7 involves a further problem of confrontation,
but is clouded in this case by a government contention of mootness.18
Petitioner was employed from 1941 until 1956 as a tool maker at Bell
Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo, New York. In 1956 his clearance
was withdrawn, and he was discharged. The statement of reasons
charged that in 1942 and 1943 petitioner had been a member of,
paid dues to, and held a membership card in the Communist Party;
and, it was charged, he "may still have membership in the Communist
Party."'159 The hearing consisted exclusively of evidence in support
155. Greene v. Wilson, 150 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1957).
156. Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
157. The lower court proceedings are not reported. Certiorari to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia was granted at 358 U.S. 918 (1958) (No.
504, Oct. Term 1958).
158. Judgment of the jurisdictional question was reserved for argument on
the merits. 79 Sup. Ct. 578 (1959).
159. The summary of facts is taken from the transcript of record and peti-
tioner's brief in the Supreme Court.
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of petitioner's categorically sworn denial of the charges. In the
course of subsequent reviews and rehearings confrontation was never
granted; but there were read into the record six anonymous synopses
of communist affiliation in 1942-43, five of which refuted the allegation
of continued membership by stating that petitioner had been expelled
from the Party in 1943. The accusers appeared to have been casual
informants rather than regularly used confidential informants. Clear-
ance was denied on two separate occasions, most recently on October
13, 1958. But on December 31, 1958, shortly after the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari, the Acting Secretary of Defense found
that the "clearance of Charles Allen Taylor is in the national interest."
On January 9, 1959, the government sought to have the case dismissed
as moot; but, as noted above, the Court agreed to hear argument on
the mootness question at the same time as the merits.
Vitarelli v. Seaton31 potentially raises the issue of confrontation
also, but relief could be given petitioner on a narrower ground of
statutory interpretation. Briefly, the case involves an employee in
the Department of Interior, designated as an "Education and Train-
ing Specialist." In 1954 he was suspended by the Secretary of the
Interior on charges (among others) (1) that he was a member of or
in sympathy with the Communist Party; (2) that his behavior,
activities, and associations tended to show that he was not reliable or
trustworthy; and (3) that he had deliberately misrepresented or
falsified material facts in answering questions put to him in 1952 by
the Interior Department Loyalty Board. At the hearing petitioner
filed an answer, together with some forty-four affidavits, but was not
confronted with any witnesses; and certain information was withheld
as confidential. After hearing, petitioner was dismissed. The suit
for reinstatement relied principally on the doctrine of Cole v. Young'61
which denied the applicability of Executive Order 10450. Continuance
of termination provided for in the new order was based upon inde-
pendent authority under the general personnel laws. Petitioner con-
tended that there remained a defamatory "badge of infamy" which
could be cured only by reinstatement; but the court of appeals rejected
the contention, stating:
There is no basis on which we can weigh the evidence, or con-
clude that the Secretary's action in dismissing appellant could not
properly be rested on that ground. The power of the Executive to
discharge for untrustworthiness or deliberate misrepresentation
is beyond dispute .... 112
160. 253 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 871 (1958) (No. 101,
Oct. Term 1958).
161. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
162. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 253 F.2d 338, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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Judge Fahy dissented on the nonconstitutional ground that the dis-
charge could not be regarded "as in any sense independent of Execu-
tive Order 10450."163
These three cases, then, present for decision a number of aspects of
the loyalty-security program. At the threshold of each case is the
issue of justiciable controversy or not. It is difficult to agree with the
court of appeals in Greene that no issue for judicial determination
was presented. There can be no denying the fact that if petitioner had
not resigned he would have been discharged by his employer in order
to forestall cancellation of all its defense contracts. It is patently
unrealistic to argue that the condition of employee clearance in all
defense contracts is merely an ordinary aspect of contracts freely
negotiated between parties bargaining on equal terms. The denial
of clearance to petitioner by the government was the operative act
inducing employment termination, to the clear detriment of petitioner
who was severely damaged in reputation and in economic well-being.
Accordingly, it is proper judicial business to inquire into these private
consequences of governmental action.164 All three petitioners argue
denial of constitutional rights by virtue of the conceded lack of con-
frontation and, to some extent, insufficient notice of the charges.
Greene raises the issue most sharply, and possibly inescapably,
whereas Taylor and Vitarelli could be decided on nonconstitutional
grounds. Both of these, however, argue in addition that the proceed-
ings to date, no matter what rectification is now given by way of
expunging records, is insufficient to remove the stain of a charge of
disloyalty. Accordingly both demand affirmative retraction of all
charges in contrast to the merely negative act of clearing the records.
All three cases also raise the question of potential distinction
between regularly employed confidential agents and mere casual
informants, for in each of these cases important, and perhaps prin-
cipal, reliance seems to have been placed on the testimony of casual
informants whom the government was nevertheless unwilling to
disclose.165
163. Id. at 343.
164. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355
U.S. 579 (1958); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349
U.S. 331 (1955); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
165. In a brief amicus in the Greene case the American Civil Liberties Union
suggests that a distinction may be drawn between "under-cover" and "casual"
informants, arguing that complete confrontation is constitutionally necessary at
least as to the latter.
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CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this article to make two principal points:
First, that confrontation can be made available in federal administra-
tive proceedings to persons against whom loyalty-security charges
are advanced by an agency of the federal government without thereby
endangering the national security. What is sought in these cases is
the disclosure of witnesses and whatever evidence is considered in
reaching a decision on the charges. This does not necessitate dis-
closure of defense or other essential secrets. Second, it has been
argued that in any event the government is forbidden by the constitu-
tional requirements of due process from refusing confrontation in
these cases. That is, where a valuable right such as employment by
the government or by a contractor with the government is in issue,
it may not be taken away without a hearing, including such essentials
of fairness as adequate notice of charges and full confrontation.
If these conclusions are accepted as sound, it is apparent that the
Greene, Taylor, and Vitarelli cases should be reversed because of the
fundamental unfairness of the hearing procedures resulting in each
case in discharge of petitioner from remunerative employment, ac-
companied by the casting of doubt on each petitioner's loyalty to his
country. Even if reversal in the Taylor and Vitarelli cases may be
possible on nonconstitutional grounds, it seems necessary to reach
the constitutional issue in the Greene case.165 It is believed that full
disclosure of all witnesses essential to establish the government's case
is required. At the very minimum confrontation is necessary as to
casual informants who, in this case, may very well constitute all the
sources of information adverse to petitioner.
If the thesis of this article, that confrontation is required in ad-
ministrative proceedings involving loyalty-security charges, becomes
accepted in practice, an additional inquiry is relevant. If the govern-
ment is still reluctant, for any reason, to disclose the necessary wit-
nesses and evidence, what are the consequences? Has it any alterna-
tive choices? Where the question is one of continued employment,
whether by the government or by a contractor with the government,
it follows that the employee may not be discharged, although in some
(but not all) cases reassignment may be possible to a position not
requiring access to classified data. Obviously this may be a difficult
choice and thus raises the issue most sharply, as the pending cases
demonstrate. But the government is always faced with hard con-
stitutional choices. It may not evade constitutional responsibility on
166. Petitioner also argues in the Greene case that statutory authority is lack-
ing for the administrative denial of confrontation. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 52-58,
Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 872 (1958).
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such grounds. Fortunately, the choice is not always presented in such
an acute form. Consider, for example, the following:
(1) In cases involving the issuance or not of passports, there is no
question of access to classified materials. If the Department of State
is in any case reluctant to disclose the source of adverse information,
it may avoid that necessity by the simple expedient of issuing the
passport.1 67 To grant the passport does not give the applicant access
to any government secrets or ifies. Rather, it simply assures freedom
of travel, a constitutionally protected right. As the Supreme Court
noted in Kent 'v. Dulles:
The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment.168
(2) Similarly, in loyalty-security investigations relating to induc-
tion into, or discharge from, the military service, there is no require-
ment that any individual in the military service be given access to,
or assured continued access to, classified data. This applies a fortiori
when the only issue is the characterization of the discharge as
honorable or less than honorable. Surely a person should neither be
denied induction nor given a less than honorable discharge for loyalty-
security reasons without an opportunity to know and confront his
accusers.169
(3) In the Port Security Program there is no question of seamen's
access to secret data. For that and other reasons it has been held
improper to deny confrontation where the alternative does not involve
access to government secrets.170
(4) In connection with aliens seeking admission to the United
States, as already observed, there is no constitutional requirement
for any kind of a hearing. However, as to resident aliens a fair
hearing, including confrontation, is required for deportation and, it
would seem, in other cases where executive decisions affecting individ-
ual aliens are made on the basis of disputed facts. Again there is no
question of access to government secrets; so a decision to refuse
confrontation would simply mean, under circumstances like those in
Jay v. Boyd, 71 that the discretionary stay of deportation would be
granted rather than withheld-scarcely a dangerous result.
167. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Freedom to Travel, Re-
port of the Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures 80-83 (1958).
168. 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
169. Cf. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). See Jones, Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts to Review the Character of Military Administrative Dis-
charges, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 917, 930-36 (1957).
170. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
171. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
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(5) In the case of applicants for the classification of conscientious
objector, the only question is exemption or not from regular military
service. In the unlikely event that some useful national purpose could
be served by withholding from the applicant the information adverse
to his claim, the alternative, granting the requested reclassification,
would not appear to be seriously detrimental to the national interest.
Nondisclosure in these cases is particularly difficult to justify.
It should be emphasized once more, however, that these distinctions
and variations among the programs are not determinative of the
constitutional question. It must by now be clear that this observer
believes that confrontation which is fair in the circumstances must
be afforded in all federal administrative proceedings involving loyalty-
security charges.
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